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ADDITIONS TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents agree with the Statement of the Case 
so made in Appellant's Brief. That an Order of Sale and 
Certified Copy for Foreclosure Decree prepared by the At-
torney for the Apellant was filed. That the Sheriff noticed 
the sale, made the same according to the Order and Decree, 
filed his retum showing that the property stated in the de-
cree was sold as one parcel for the sum of $501.00 to the 
named purchaser. 
ADDITIONS TO THE TESTIMONY 
The appellant in presenting the testimony at the hearing 
has stressed parts of the evidence and passed over much 
other evidence and omitted some entirely; so, the respon-
dents at this time will submit the following for the court's 
attention: 
The Sheriff, Ulysses Larsen, testified that on the 12th 
day of April, 1950, in his office, he had conversation with 
P. N. Anderson, attomey for the Appellant, conceming the 
Order for Sale and Decree for Foreclosure in the above en-
titled case. Mr. Anderson had put in the Order that the 
time of the sale was to be 10:00 A.M. on May 8th, 1950. 
They allegedly decided during this conversation that the 
time for the sale should be changed to 11:00 A.M. on the 
same day. Due to a misunderstanding who was to change the 
Order, it was never changed either by the Sheriff or the 
Attorney for the Appellant. That on the 8th day of May at 
10:00 A.M. the Sheriff held the sale, but only after having 
gone through the statuatory requirements and having given 
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notice for the sale to be at 10:00 A.M. (Tr. Rec. pp. 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7). 
Mr. Paul Smith made the first bid for the sum of 
$49.00. The Sheriff refused this bid telling Mr. Smith, that 
it was unreasonable. Mr. Smith then asked the Sheriff what 
sum was a reasonable bid. He stated about $1000,00. Mr. 
Smith then offered $500.00. Mr. Jeppson bid $501.00 and the 
property was struck off to him. When asked why he sold 
the property in one parcel or piece, the Sheriff stated that 
it had the appearance of being in one parcel even though 
the description was in two lots. None of the bidders present, 
nor the defendents, objected to the sale in one parcel. None 
of the bidders nor the defendants had any notice of the Con-
versation between the Sheriff and Attorney for the Appellant 
on the 12th day of April. All orders and publications stated 
the sale to be at 10:00 A.M. on the day in question. 
Witness C. H. Beal, a real estate broker, testified that 
he owned a lot in the same block as this property. That in 
his opinion the market value of the land was what they 
could get out of it. His opinion was what they could get 
out of it. His opinion was that the value would be about 
$1400.00 or $1500.00. He stated that there was a crude fence 
separating the two lots (Tr. Rec. pp. 8, 9, 10, 11). 
Mr. P. N. Anderson, Attorney for the Appellant, made 
a statement confirming the Sheriff's testimony. That he pre-
pared the Order and Notices for the sale set for 10:00 A.M. 
That he had a conversation with the Sheriff concerning 
changing the time to 11:00 A.M., but that due to a misunder-
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standing the change was never made. That he never told 
any of the other interested parties concerning this conver-
sation, and he never checked to determine if the Order and 
Notices were so changed (Tr. Rec. pp. 11, 12). 
Witness Paul M. Smith, a resident of Manti, and owner 
of four lots in Manti, was at the Sheriff's sale on the 8th day 
of May. He is the State of Utah appraiser in this area, and 
has had considerable experience as appraiser for the District 
Court of Sanpete County. Mr. Smith states that after an 
apparent stall by the Sheriff the sale was opened for bids. 
That he bid $49.00, but tht Sheriff refused to accept it be-
cause the bid was unreasonable. Mr. Smith then asked the 
Sheriff what sum was reasonable. The Sheriff answered 
that a reasonable sum was one thousand dollars. Mr. Smith 
said it wasn't worth one thousand dollars, and he thereafter 
bid $500.00. At the same time Mr. J. B. Peacock of Manti, 
Utah, bid $475.00. The property was finally sold to the pur-
chaser, Mr. Jeppson, for the sum of $501.00 (Sup. Tr. Rec. 
pp. 3, 4, 5). 
Witness J. B. Peacock, a resident of Manti and owner 
of real property, was also at the sale. He bid $475.00 for the 
property treating both lots as one parcel. He stated that 
there was no fence on the land but there were several strands 
of wire. He stated that the rental value was probably about 
$7.50 a month (Sup. Tr. Rec. pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13). 
The Defendant Leonard Madsen, was at the sale, and 
he states that he had no reason to object because the land 
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was sold as one parcel. That he had no other noitce of the 
sale than that published in the papers for 10: 00 A.M. He 
had no knowledge of any conversation between the Sheriff 
and the Attorney for the Appellant concerning time of 
sale (Sup. Tr. Rec. pp. 13, 14, 15). 
ARGUMENT 
!i!t The respondents will argue the points as set out in 
!! the Appellant's Brief. 
Appellant's Point I 
THAT THE SALE WAS NOT MADE OF THE 
PROPERTY IN TWO PARCELS AS REQUIRED BY 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 69 (e) 3, RE-
SULTING IN GROSSLY INADEQUATE BIDS, TO THE 
PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF. 
The part of Rule 69 (e) 3, which we are concerned 
with reads as follows: 
"And when the sale is of real property, consisting 
of several known lots or parcels, they must be sold 
separately; or when a portion of such real property 
is claimed by a third person, and he requires it to 
be sold separately, such portion must be thus sold." 
- - - - "The judgement debtor, if present at the 
sale, may also direct the order in which the property, 
real or personal, shall be sold, when such property 
consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles 
which can be sold to advantage separatly, and the 
officer must follow such directions." 
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It is the Appellant's contention that the fact the des-
cription was of lots 1 and 2, that they are therefore two 
separate parcels, and should have been sold separately to 
conform with the rule stated above (Rec. pp. 31, 32, 33, 34, 
35, 27). 
The respondents rely upon the contention that you 
can have two or more lots and still only have one parcel 
containing them. Often a building will be placed on several 
lots, It would seem reasonable that in such a situation all 
of these lots would constitute only one parcel. To say that 
the Rule 69 (e) 3, intended that each of these lots be sold 
separately would be placing false construction on the rule. 
33 C.J.S. Section 210, page 449, states as follows: 
"What constitutes separate tract, lot, or parcel. 
It has been held that it is the title of the debtor 
himself, as fixed by his deed, which determines 
whether the property shall be considered as one lot 
or several for the purpose of an execution sale, but 
it cannot. be said that because a deed describes the 
property conveyed as certain numbered lots that such 
lots do or do not constitute separate parcels (Pal-
mour v. Roper Ga. 45 S.E. 790). An owner may con-
vert two or more lots into one known parcel by his 
use of the land (In re Roach, 130 A. 676 Del., Security 
Trust Co. v. Sloman, Mich. 233 N.W. 216), and a 
parcel may be single although divided by a ~ 
(Mich. Security Trust Co. v. Sloman, 233 N.W. 216)" 
In 23 Corpus Juris, Section 589, page e33, Note 34, 
it states the reason for such a rule: 
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"Palmour v. Roper, 119 Ga 10, 45 SE 790; Conley 
v. Redwine, 109 Ga. 640, 35 SE 92, 77 AmSR 389. 
(a) REASON FOR RULE. It is well known fact 
that land lots are laid off purely for purposes of lo-
cation and description, and have no reference to di-
visions of land into what are known as tracts, or par-
cels, except as the two may arbitrarily chance to 
coinside. Palmour v. Roper, 
(b) ILLUSTRATION. Although a tract of land has 
in fact been laid off into streets and town lots, and 
is within the limits of an unincorporated town, yet, 
where there are no visible marks on the surface of 
the tract to indicate the metes and bounds of the 
lots, and the only thing in the nature of the street 
appearing thereon is a recognized public road of the 
county, a levy upon and sale of the entire tract as 
one parcel is proper and legal. Conley v. Redwine." 
Under our present case the land consists of lots 1 and 
2, a house on one lot and the other vacant. The lots of the 
property adjoin each other and constitute the South half of 
Block 28, Plat A, IVIanti City Survey. At the sale all the par-
ties treated the property as a single parcel. Even the Sheriff, 
witness for the Appellant, when asked why he sold as one 
parcel, answered that the property has the appearance of 
being one parcel, though the description covers two lots (Tr. 
pp. 7). So, also, the bidders each treated the property as 
one parcel (Sup. Tr. Rec. pp. 4, line 13, page 6 line 14, pp. 
7 line 20). From the above evidence it would therefore 
appear that the property though described in two lots is 
actually one parcel, and the sale was therefore made accord-
ing to Rule 69 (e) 3. There was some evidence that a fence 
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was dividing the lots; giving Mr. Beal (Tr. pp 9, line 16, 
Tr. pp. 10, line 22), there was also evidence given by Mr. 
Peacock saying there wasn't a fence (Sup. Tr. Rec. pp. 11, 
line 18) . There was no evidence to show if the alleged fence 
was on the line dividing the lots. If there was such evi-
dence it would appear that the bidders at this sale would 
have asked the Sheriff if the sale included property beyond 
the fence, or that the defendants would have raised the 
question. The only parties who feel that this consisted of 
two separate parcels are the Appellant Bank and it's attorney, 
and there were no such instructions in the Order of Sale 
which was prepared by them (Rec. pp. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 
27). 
It is therefore the contention of the Purchaser Res-
pondent that the sale was made in conformity with the Rule 
69 (e) 3, of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Ap-
pellant has failed to state any Cause of Action against him. 
Appellant does not plead or claim any wrongful act on the 
part of the respondent. 
For the purpose of this argument however, let us 
assume that because this property was described as lots 1 
and 2, it is two different parcels. What would be the effect 
on appellant's contention? It has been held that the statu-
tory provision for a division of property is merely directory 
(23 C.J. p 633 note 23) and that the propriety of a sale 
en masse is a matter within the discretion of the officer, 
having in view the object to make the property bring the 
best possible price, as is also the question as to the divis-
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ibility of the property and the size and value of the par-
cels offered, and the officer's determination of this question 
is, in the absence of fraud, conclusive (Ind. Nelson v. Bron-
nenburg, 81 Ind. 193). In this case the Sheriff sold the pro-
perty the way he did because it had the appearance of being 
in one parcel, and because there were no instructions to the 
contrary in the order prepared by Attorney for the Appel-
lant. So also, by the actions of the bidders it is doubtful 
that the Sheriff could have received a higher bid even 
though offered in two parcels. Defendant states that he does 
not think it could have been sold for more money (Sup. 
Tr. Rec. pp. 14, line 8). 
It can also be argued by the Purchaser Respondent 
that both the plaintiff and the defendants waived their 
rights to object to the procedure used by the Sheriff in sell-
ing this property. 
33 C. J. S. Section 210, c, page 450, states: 
"As the rule requiring a sale in parcels is intended 
for the benefit of execution defendant, compliance 
with it may be waived by him (Clover v. W.B. 
Scarborough Co. 238 P. 1104 Calif., Mont. Fox v. 
Curry, 29 P 2nd 663, 23 CJ p 635, note 55, O'Brien 
v. Davis, 103 Ala. 429, 15 S. 860, where it was in-
timated that by being present at the sale and failing 
to make any objection defendant waives any irreg-
ularity in selling en masse). 
33 C.J.S. Section 228, page 485 under c. Execution 
Creditor it is stated: 
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"When not transcending the mandate of his writ, the 
Sheriff may be considered in some degree as the 
judgement creditor's agent, and the latter is as a 
rule estopped from assailing the validity of a sale 
made by virtue of such writ (Ga. Lynn v. New Eng-
land Mortg. Sec. Co., 26 S.E. 750, 98 Ga 442, 23 
C. J. p 669 note 91) ." 
In this case the attorney for the Appellant prepared 
the Order of Sale and also the Decree for Foreclosure, if 
he desired that the property be sold in separate lots he 
should have so notified the Sheriff in the respective Order 
and Decree. Instead Appellant advertised the two lots for 
sale as one parcel, to-wit, "Lots 1 and 2 of Block 28, Plat 
"A" of Manti City Survey" (Rec. pp. 32). If the Appellant 
had intended the Sheriff to sell the property in two parcels, 
he would have advertised them for sale as Lot 1 of Block 
28, Plat "A" of Manti City Survey, and Lot 2 of Block 28, 
Plat "A" of Manti City Survey. To allow the Appellent to 
come in and get the sale set aside because the Sheriff acted 
according to his own Order would be without merit. There-
fore it appears to the Respondents that the Appellant 
has waived any right to object to this sale. 
The Appellant states that the property was sold at a 
sum grossly inadequate. May the Court recall that at th~ 
time of the sale there were three bidders present, each a 
resident of Manti, one with experience as an appraiser 
(Sup. Tr. Rec. pp. 3), and the other owners of property. 
None of their bids were over $501.00. Appellant has one 
witness which states the property to be worth $1400.00 or 
10 
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$1500.00, but that the market price is what he can get out 
of it. 
This witness, a real estate broker, was not however 
at the sale, although he had an opportunity to so be. He 
also owned a piece of property in the same block with a 
house on it, and he sold it for $1000.00, he did not state what 
he paid for it. 
50 C.J.S. Section 59, p 677 states as a general rule: 
"A judicial sale usually will not be vacated or set 
aside for mere inadequacy of price, unless the inad-
equacy is so gross as to raise a presumption of fraud, 
or to shock the conscience of the court." 
Page 682 states: 
"Ordinarily, the highest bid made at an open ju-
dicial sale fairly conducted, after full notice, in the 
face of such competition as can be attracted, is a 
fair and just criterion of the value of the property 
at that time, (Va. Schweitzer v. Stroh, 30 S.E. 2nd 
689) and opinions, affidavits of undervaluation, and 
the like, are entitled to little weight in comparison 
with the fact established by the sale and it's results. 
The mere tender of an upset bid of substantially more 
than the sum realized at the sale is not conclusive 
that the property sold for an inadequate price." 
For the above stated reasons the Sale price of $501.00 
was an adequate bid for the property sold. 
That the Sale made by the Sheriff was conducted 
according to Utah Rules of Civil Precedure 69 (e) 3, in that 
the property was but one parcel. 
11 
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Appellant's Point II 
THAT THE PROCEEDING BY THE SHERIFF IN 
FAILING TO NOTICE SALE AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK 
A.M., AS INSTRUCTED BY PLAINTIFF AND AS UN-
DERSTOOD BY PLIANTIFF AND SHERIFF, AND IDS 
FAILING TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF IDS FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH THE INSTRUCTION AND CON-
FORM WITH SUCH UNDERSTANDING AND THERE-
BY PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM BEING PRESENT, 
RESULTED IN GROSSLY INADEQUATE BIDS AND 
SALE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY, AND CONSTITUTED 
A PREJUDICIAL IRREGULARITY. 
The question here seems to be whether a private con-
versation between the Sheriff and the Attorney for the Appel-
lant should be binding upon the court and the purchaser. 
To allow such a conversation to be grounds for setting a-
side a Foreclosure sale involving innocent third parties 
would be to say that Purchasers at Execution Sales and 
Foreclosure Sales have no rights what-so-ever. The evidence 
is pure hearsay as to the purchaser and is not binding on 
him or anyone. 
If the conversation did take place, it would appear 
that the Appellant's remedy would be against the Sheriff 
for failing to act according to instructions. None of the re-
spondents nor the court had any knowledge of this alleged 
conversation until after a valid Sheriff's sale had been com-
pleted, nor until Appellant made it's motion to set aside the 
sale. If a mistake was made, it was made by the careless-
12 
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ness of the Attorney for the Appellant, or the Sheriff, and 
the remedy should be against them. To allow the Appellant 
to come in and complain against this innocent third person, 
the purchaser, would be to give authority to private conver-
sations, and to ignore the Order of the Court. The Sheriff's 
duty is to act according to the Order of the Court (Rec. pp. 
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 27), and in the present case he so 
acted. 
Appellant's Point III 
THAT THE SALE PRICE ACCEPTED BY THE 
SHERIFF WAS GROSSLY INCOMMENSURATE TO THE 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SOLD. 
The respondents have argued this same statement un-
der it's discussion of Appellant's Point No. 1. 
50 C.J.S. Section 59, page 681, states: 
"d. Proof The burden of proving inadequacy 
of price suficient to warrant setting aside a judicial 
sale rests on the complaining party' and the court 
may consider all proper and relevant ciscumstan-
ces in determining the matter." 
The District Court of Sanpete County after hearing 
the witnesses for the Appellant and the witnesses for the 
Respondent held that the sale was consistent with the value 
of the property on the execution sale (Rec. pp. 46). 
59 C.J.S. Section 750, page 1382, states as follows: 
"Notwithstanding alleged additional ci);'cumstanc~s, 
13 
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however, setting aside the sale may not be proper 
or necessary in a particular case, as where the sup-
erior equity still remains with the purchaser, or 
where the mistake, irregularity, or other circum-
stance had nothing to do with the price the proper-
ty brought, or the price obtained is not shown to 
have been inadequate. Each case depends largely 
on its own peculiar facts, and whether the circum-
stances, coupled with inadequacy of price, are suf-
ficient to warrant setting aside the sale is a mat-
ter largely within the discretition of the trial court.'' 
The appellant would have the Court believe that the 
value of this property is the price a judgement creditor 'i: 
would bid in his debt on a foreclosure sale. That is not 
so. A judgement creditor may pay a very high price if he 
figures that his deficiency judgement is worthless, and may 'tl 
pay a very low price if he has no competition and he knows 
the deficiency judgement is valuable. To say therefore that 
the bid in the present case is the value of the land, when 
there was an actual sale and competition between three 
bidders to find the purchase price, would not be true. 
The value of the property sold on Foreclosure Sale 
is the amount the purchaser paid for it, and may be much 
less on such sale than on the open market. The reason 
being that the purchaser doesn't necessarily get good title 
and his title is also subject to redemption. This appeal is 
a good example of the additional costs a purchaser is re-
quired to go to in the protection of the title purchased. 
The Appellant would have the Court believe that 
justice lies only on the side fo the Appellant. They state 
14 
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on page 10 of their Brief: 
"The writers do not intend to impute mal-
feasance on the part of the Sheriff in this instance. 
But will it be wise on the part of this Court to 
affirm the dereliction on the part of this Sheriff 
and set a precedent?" 
The respondents submit the decision and the order 
appealed from, and desire the Court to realize that there 
is no dereliction of duty on the part of the Sheriff. He fol-
lowed the Order of the Court in performing this sale. He 
noticed the property for sale in accordance with the writ-
ten Notice of Sale given to him by the Appellant's Attorney. 
He used his best judgement in selling this property in one 
parcel. He accepted the highest bid from the bidders pre-
sent at the sale. He made a correct return according to law. 
The only precedent that will be made in sustaining this 
decision and order, is that of sustaining a Foreclosure Sale 
made according to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
State of Utah. To make any other decision would be to 
cause injustice to the purchaser, and to set a precedent 
for setting aside Foreclosure Sales based upon private con-
versations outside the knowledge or jurisdiction of the Court, 
and upon the carelessness of the Appellent in failing to at-
tend the sale at the time the property was advertised for 
sale. Certainly the Appellant is bound by the advertised 
notice of sale, as all other persons are so bound. 
In conclusion, there is only one question to decide. 
Should a judgement creditor be able to set aside a Valid 
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Foreclosure Sale because he allegedly made a mistake, 
and forgot to come to the sale. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney jOT the 
Respondents. 
Manti, Utah 
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